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Abstract Trying to pass someone walking toward you in
a narrow corridor is a familiar example of a two-person
motor game that requires coordination. In this study, we
investigate coordination in sensorimotor tasks that corre-
spond to classic coordination games with multiple Nash
equilibria, such as ‘‘choosing sides,’’ ‘‘stag hunt,’’
‘‘chicken,’’ and ‘‘battle of sexes’’. In these tasks, subjects
made reaching movements reﬂecting their continuously
evolving ‘‘decisions’’ while they received a continuous
payoff in the form of a resistive force counteracting their
movements. Successful coordination required two subjects
to ‘‘choose’’ the same Nash equilibrium in this force-payoff
landscape within a single reach. We found that on the
majority of trials coordination was achieved. Compared to
the proportion of trials in which miscoordination occurred,
successful coordination was characterized by several dis-
tinct features: an increased mutual information between the
players’ movement endpoints, an increased joint entropy
during the movements, and by differences in the timing of
the players’ responses. Moreover, we found that the
probability of successful coordination depends on the
players’ initial distance from the Nash equilibria. Our
results suggest that two-person coordination arises natu-
rally in motor interactions and is facilitated by favorable
initial positions, stereotypical motor pattern, and differ-
ences in response times.
Keywords Motor coordination   Multi-agent interaction  
Game theory
Introduction
Many human interactions require coordination. When we
walk down a corridor, for example, and encounter someone
walking toward us, there are two equally viable options in
this classic ‘‘choosing sides’’ game: we could move to the
right while the other person passes on the left or conversely
move to the left while the other person passes on the right.
Crucially, each of the two solutions requires that the two
actors make their choice in a mutually consistent fashion.
In everyday situations, we usually master this problem
gracefully, although sometimes it can lead to a series of
awkward readjustments. Such continuous pair-wise inter-
actions are distinct from the typical studies of cognitive
game theory in which subjects may be required to make
single discrete choices such as choosing left or right. In
such a discrete situation, without communication or a
previous agreement, the coordination problem can initially
only occasionally be solved by chance, if both players
happen to make the correct choice.
The problem of continuous motor coordination has been
previously studied from a dynamical systems point of view
(Kelso 1995), but not within the framework of game the-
ory. Coordination problems have a long history in game
theory and the social sciences (Fudenberg and Tirole
1991). In the eighteenth century, for example, Rousseau
considered the now classic ‘‘stag hunt’’ game. In this game,
each member of a group can choose to either hunt a highly
valued stag or a lower-valued hare. However, the stag is
caught only if everybody cooperates to hunt it in unison
whereas each person can capture a hare independent of
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problem has two different solutions: the cooperative stag
solution which is called payoff-dominant, since it gives
higher payoff to all participants, and the hare solution
which is risk-dominant, because it is the safe option that
cannot be thwarted by anybody.
Unlike games such as prisoners’ dilemma which have a
single Nash solution, coordination games have multiple
Nash equilibria. In a Nash equilibrium, each player chooses
a strategy so that no player has anything to gain by
changing only his or her strategy unilaterally. As no player
has any incentive to switch their strategy, each player’s
strategy in a Nash equilibrium is a best response given the
strategies of all the other players. Nash equilibria can be
pure or mixed. In a pure Nash equilibrium, each player
chooses a deterministic strategy that uniquely determines
every move the player will make for any situation he or she
could face. In a mixed Nash equilibrium, players stochas-
tically choose their strategies, thus, randomizing their
actions so that they cannot be predicted by their opponent.
In coordination games, there are multiple Nash equilibria,
often both pure and mixed. Importantly, although the Nash
equilibrium concept (Nash 1950) speciﬁes which solutions
should occur in a game, in coordination games the problem
of how to select a particular equilibrium—that is how to
coordinate—is unanswered. To address this issue, the
concept of correlated equilibrium has been proposed
(Aumann 1974, 1987), in which the two players accept a
coordinating advice from an impartial third party so as to
correlate their decisions. Consider for example the coor-
dination game of ‘‘battle of sexes,’’ where a husband enjoys
taking his wife to a football match (which she dislikes)
while she prefers to take her husband to the opera (which
he abhors). However, both dislike going on their own even
more. A correlated equilibrium would then allow a solo-
monic solution of taking turns as indicated by the third
party. Similarly, in the game of ‘‘chicken,’’ which is also
known as the game of ‘‘hawk and dove,’’ two players do
not want to yield to the other player, however, the outcome
where neither player yields is the worst possible for both
players. This game is often illustrated by two drivers that
are on collision course, where neither wants to swerve in
order not to be called a ‘‘chicken,’’ however, if neither
swerves then both suffer a great loss. Again an impartial
third party could determine who swerves and who stays
over repeated trials to make it a ‘‘fair’’ game.
Correlated equilibria can also be reached in the absence
of an explicit third party by learning over many trials,
provided that the same coordination problem is faced
repeatedly (Chalkiadakis and Boutilier 2003; Greenwald
and Hall 2003). In the case of continuous motor games,
coordination might even be achievable within a single trial
through the process of within-trial adaptation in continuous
motor interactions (Braun et al. 2009a). In the following,
we will refer to this ‘‘within-trial’’ adaptation simply as
adaptation reﬂecting changes in subjects’ responses during
individual trials or reaches. To investigate two-player co-
adaptation in motor coordination tasks, we employed a
recently developed task design that translates classical
2-by-2 matrix games into continuous motor games (Braun
et al. 2009b). We exposed subjects to the motor versions of
four different coordination games: ‘‘choosing sides,’’ ‘‘stag
hunt,’’ ‘‘chicken,’’ and ‘‘battle of sexes’’. In each game,
there were always two pure Nash equilibria and one mixed
Nash equilibrium. The presence of multiple equilibria is
the crucial characteristic of coordination games since it
poses the problem of equilibrium selection or coordination.
This allowed us to study the general features that charac-
terize successful coordination in a number of different two-
player motor interactions.
Methods
Participants
Twelve naı ¨ve participants provided written informed con-
sent before taking part in the experiment in six pairs. All
participants were students at the University of Cambridge.
The experimental procedures were approved by the Psy-
chology Research Ethics Committee of the University of
Cambridge.
Experimental apparatus
The experiment was conducted using two vBOTs which are
planar robotic interfaces. The custom-built device consists
of a parallelogram constructed mainly from carbon ﬁber
tubes that are driven by rare earth motors via low-friction
timing belts. High-resolution incremental encoders are
attached to the drive motors to permit accurate computation
of the robot’s position. Care was taken with the design to
ensure it was capable of exerting large end-point forces
while still exhibiting high stiffness, low friction, and also
low inertia. The robot’s motors were run from a pair of
switching torque control ampliﬁers that were interfaced,
along with the encoders, to a multifunctional I/O card on a
PC using some simple logic to implement safety features.
Software control of the robot was achieved by means of a
control loop running at 1,000 Hz, in which position and
force were measured and desired output force was set. For
further technical details, see (Howard et al. 2009). Partic-
ipants held the handle of the vBOT that constrained hand
movements to the horizontal plane. Using a projection
system, we overlaid virtual visual feedback into the plane
of the movement. Each of the vBOT handles controlled the
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123position of a circular cursor (gray color, radius 1.25 cm) in
one half of the workspace (Fig. 1). The position of the
cursor was updated continuously throughout the trial.
Task design
At the beginning of each trial, 15-cm-wide starting bars
were displayed on each side of the workspace (see Fig. 1).
Participants were ﬁrst required to place their cursor sta-
tionary within their respective starting bars, at which point
two 15-cm target bars appeared at a distance randomly
drawn from the uniform distribution between 5 and 20 cm
(the same distance for both players on each trial). Each
participant’s task was to move their cursor to their
respective target bar. This required them to make a forward
movement (y-direction) to touch the target bar within a
time window of 1,500 ms. The participants were free to
touch it anywhere along its width (the robot simulated
walls which prevented participants moving further laterally
than the width of the bar). During the movement, both
players experienced a simulated one-dimensional spring,
with origin on the starting bar, which produced a force on
their hand in the negative y-direction thereby resisting their
forward motion. The participants experienced forces
F1 =- K1y1 and F2 =- K2y2 resisting their forward
motion in which y1 and y2 are the y-distances of player 1
and 2’s hands from the starting bar, respectively. The
spring constants K1 and K2 depended on the lateral posi-
tions x1 and x2 of both players, where x corresponds to a
normalized lateral deviation ranging between 0 and 1, such
that the edges of the target bar (-7.5 and ?7.5 cm) cor-
respond to values 0 and 1. On each trial, the assignment of
whether the left hand side or the right hand side of each
target corresponded to 0 or 1 was randomized. Payoffs for
intermediate lateral positions were obtained by bilinear
interpolation: Ki¼a 1 x1
x1
   T M
ðiÞ
0;0 M
ðiÞ
1;0
M
ðiÞ
0;1 M
ðiÞ
1;1
 !
x2
1 x2
  
.
The 2-by-2 payoff matrices M
(1) and M
(2) deﬁned the
boundary values for the spring constants for players 1 and 2
at the extremes of the x1x2-space. That is Mj,k
(i) is the payoff
receivedbyplayeriifplayer1takesactionx1 = jandplayer
2 takes action x1 = k. The scaling parameter a was constant
throughout the experiment at 0.19 N/cm. Each game is
deﬁned by a different set of payoff matrices given by
Coordination game Mð1Þ ¼ 0:11
10 :1
  
and Mð2Þ ¼ 0:11
10 :1
  
;
Stag hunt Mð1Þ ¼
0:11
0:50 :5
  
and Mð2Þ ¼
0:10 :5
10 :5
  
;
Chicken Mð1Þ ¼ 0:50 :7
0:11
  
and Mð2Þ ¼ 0:50 :1
0:71
  
;
Battle of sexes Mð1Þ ¼
0:11
10 :5
  
and Mð2Þ ¼
0:51
10 :1
  
:
Fig. 1 Experimental setup. Player 1 and Player 2 each control a
cursor from a start bar to a target bar. The movement can be chosen
anywhere along the x-axes. However, the forces that resist the
players’ forward movement are given by spring constants whose
stiffness depend both on the x-position of Player 1 and on the
x-position of Player 2
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Fig. 2 Dependence of spring constants on the players’ cursor
positions. The four different games were associated with four
different pairs of payoff matrices that induced different landscapes
of spring constants to generate spring-like forces that resisted players’
forward movements. Regions with low spring constants are more
desirable for players, as they are associated with less movement effort
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123The payoff landscapes resulting from these payoff
matrices are plotted in Fig. 2. The pure Nash equilibria in
these games are [right, right] or [left, left] in the choosing
sides game, [stag, stag] and [hare, hare] in the stag hunt
game,[swerve,stay]and[stay,swerve]inthechickengame,
and [opera, opera] and [football, football] in the battle of
sexes. Each pair of subjects performed all four types of
games. The type of game changed every 20 trials. However,
since within a set of 20 trials allocation of xi being 0 and 1
was randomized to the left and right edges of the target,
subjects had to coordinate their actions anew in each trial.
This trial-by-trial randomization of the action allocation is
equivalent to permuting the payoff matrix on each trial. All
participants performed at least 10 blocks, but maximally 15
blocks of each game (i.e., at least 10 9 20 = 200 trials,
maximum 300 trials per game type). Subjects were
instructed to move the cursor to the target bar in such a
way so as to minimize the resistive forces that they
experienced. Furthermore, subjects were not permitted to
communicate with each other during the experiment.
Data analysis
The ﬁnal x-position of each player was categorized as
‘‘Action 0’’ or ‘‘Action 1’’ depending on whether x\0.5
or x[0.5. Coordination was considered successful when
the ‘‘Actions’’ were chosen according to the action choices
corresponding to the pure Nash equilibria, that is, when the
endpoints x1 and x2 were in one of the two quadrants of the
x1x2-plane containing the pure Nash equilibrium payoffs of
the matrix game. If the endpoints were in one of the other
two quadrants, then the trial was considered to be misco-
ordinated. For the analysis of mutual information and joint
entropy, we discretized the x-space in bins so as to form
three sets S1,S 2, and S3 corresponding to the intervals
0 B x B 0.25, 0.25\x\0.75, and 0.75 B x B 1,
respectively. The discretization was chosen this way to
distinguish the ‘‘unspeciﬁc’’ middle set of the x-space
(0.25\x\0.75) from the borders of the x-space corre-
sponding to ‘‘Action 0’’ and ‘‘Action 1,’’ respectively.
Trajectories were evaluated at 10 points equidistant in time
through the movement and both the mutual information
and the joint entropy were computed over ensembles of
these trajectory points that belonged to trajectories with
either successful or unsuccessful coordination at the end of
the trial. The mutual information
MIðx1;x2Þ¼
X 3
i;j¼1
pðx1 2 Si;x2 2 SjÞ
  log2
pðx1 2 Si;x2 2 SjÞ
pðx1 2 SiÞpðx2 2 SjÞ
  
measures the dependence between the two variables x1 and
x2 (with a lower bound of 0 implying independence).
MI(x1, x2) measures how well the position x1 can be pre-
dicted from knowing the position x2 in the ensemble of
successful (or unsuccessful) coordination trials. It there-
fore expresses the stereotypy of the x1x2 relationship over
different trials. Importantly, as the x1x2-quadrants for
coordinated and miscoordinated trials have the same area
there is no a priori reason for there to be a difference in
mutual information on coordinated or miscoordinated tri-
als. That is perfect miscoordination and perfect coordi-
nation (with all reaches ending in S1 or S3) would have
identical high mutual information at the end of the
movement. Therefore, mutual information provides infor-
mation as to how related the two participants movements
are at different times into a trial for different ﬁnal coor-
dination types. The joint entropy
Hðx1;x2Þ¼ 
X 3
i;j¼1
pðx1 2 Si;x2 2 SjÞ
  log2 pðx1 2 Si;x2 2 SjÞ
measures how spread out the distributions are over x1x2
across trials. As we discretized, the space into three bins
there is a maximum joint entropy of 3.2 bits. The distribu-
tions over x1x2 at the different time points from which the
mutual information and joint entropy have been computed
can be seen in Supplementary Figures S1–S3. The empirical
estimates of mutual information and joint entropy were
computed using a package described in (Peng et al. 2005).
Computational model
We developed a computational model for two-player co-
adaptation with the aim of qualitatively replicating some of
the characteristic features of successful coordination. The
model is a highly simpliﬁed abstraction of the task which is
not intended to ﬁt all features of the data but to reproduce
some key qualitative features of the dataset. Conceptually,
it considers co-adaptation as a diffusion process through a
‘‘choice space’’ and abstracts away from the fact that
movements had to be made in order to indicate choices or
that there might be biomechanical constraints. In the
model, co-adaptation is simulated by two point masses
undergoing a one-dimensional diffusion through the payoff
landscape. Each particle might be thought of as repre-
senting a player. Diffusion processes can be described both
at the level of the deterministically evolving time-depen-
dent probability density (Fokker–Planck-equation) and at
the level of the stochastically moving single particle
(Langevin equation).
634 Exp Brain Res (2011) 211:631–641
123The Langevin equation for each particle i can be written
as mdvi
dt ¼ Giðx1;x2Þ cvi þ rgi, where m = 0.1 is the
point mass, vi its instantaneous velocity, c = 0.001 is a
viscous constant capturing dissipation, Giðx1;x2Þ is a
notional force that corresponds to the gradient of the payoff
landscape with respect to changes in that players action:
Giðx1;x2Þ¼ o
oxiKi,gi is a normally distributed random
variable and r
2 = 15. Note that the mass m and the speed
v do not refer to the actual movement process, but capture
the inertia and the speed of the adaptation process. For each
game, we simulated 10,000 trajectories with 50 time steps
each (with discretized time step 0.01). The x-values were
constrained to lie within the unit interval by reﬂecting the
velocities when hitting the boundaries of 0 and 1. To
prevent cyclical bouncing of the walls, reﬂections were
simulated as inelastic reﬂections, where the outgoing speed
was only 30% of the ingoing speed (inelastic boundary
conditions). The initial x-values were sampled from a
distribution that was piecewise uniform (x-values between
0.25\x\0.75 had double the probability than x-values
with either 0 B x B 0.25 or 0.75 B x B 1). This initiali-
zation roughly corresponded to the average initial distri-
bution found in our experiments. The initial velocities were
set to 0. All the results were computed from the simulated
x-values in the same way as the experimental data.
Results
In order to assess the endpoint distribution of the games, we
deﬁned the endpoint of a trial as the time when both cursors
had crossed the target bar for the ﬁrst time. Thus, an end-
point of a game can be plotted as a point in the plane
spanned by the ﬁnal decision of each player. Figure 3a
shows the endpoint distributions of the action choices of all
pairs of players in all trials of the four games. The endpoint
distributions in all games deviate signiﬁcantly from the
initial distribution (two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test,
P\0.01), which shows that subjects evolved clear pref-
erences for certain action combinations during the trial that
differed from the starting positions. We pooled all end-
points from all blocks and trials of the games, since per-
formance was roughly stationary both over trials within a
block of twenty trials as well as over blocks of trials
(Supplementary Figure S4). This absence of over-trial
learning was a consequence of the trial-by-trial randomi-
zation of the payoff matrices and allowed us to focus on
within-trial co-adaptation during individual movements. In
order to compare our experimental results to the theoretical
predictions, we categorized subjects’ continuous choices
into four quadrants corresponding to the discrete action
pairs in the classic discrete game (Fig. 3b). In the three
games ‘‘choosing sides,’’ ‘‘stag hunt,’’ and ‘‘battle of sexes’’
the two pure Nash equilibria had the highest probability
(Fig. 3c). In these games, the coordinated solution was
signiﬁcantly more frequent than the miscoordinated solu-
tion (P\0.01 in all three games, Wilcoxon ranksum test
over the six different subject pairs). Thus, the probability of
having a coordinated solution increased from chance level
at the beginning of the movements to a signiﬁcantly ele-
vated number of coordinated trials at the end of the move-
ments (Fig. 3d). This result implies that coordination was
achieved within individual trials through a co-adaptation
process between the two actors.
In the chicken game, the two pure Nash equilibria
[swerve, stay] and [stay, swerve] have a clearly increased
probability compared to the worst case outcome of [stay,
stay]. However, the ‘‘miscoordinated’’ solution [swerve,
swerve] appears to have a comparable probability to the
coordinated solutions of the pure equilibria. This might
reﬂect an interesting property of this game, because, unlike
the other games, the two pure Nash equilibria do not con-
stitute an evolutionarily stable strategy (Smith and Price
1973; Smith 1982; Houston and McNamara 1991). Evolu-
tionarily stable strategies are a reﬁnement of the Nash
equilibrium concept, i.e., every evolutionarily stable strat-
egy constitutes a Nash solution, but not every Nash solution
is ‘‘evolutionary’’ stable. In particular, Nash solutions that
are evolutionarily stable are stable to perturbations, because
any alteration of the equilibrium strategies around the
equilibrium point leads to a strictly lower payoff. Impor-
tantly,inthechickengame,theevolutionarilystablestrategy
is given by the mixed Nash equilibrium, where each player
staysorswerveswithacertainprobability.Dependingonthe
perceived utilities of the experienced forces, the evolution-
arily stable strategy might explain the observed response
patterns.Thus,theresultsofthischickengamemightalsobe
compatible with single-trial coordination.
In order to elucidate the features that characterize suc-
cessful single-trial coordination, we investigated kinematic
differences between trials with successful coordination and
trials with coordination failure (miscoordination). First, we
assessed the statistical dependence between the two
movement trajectories by computing the mutual informa-
tion and the joint entropy over a normalized within-trial
time course of the trajectories. We found higher joint
entropy during the movement for trials with successful
coordination compared to trials with coordination failure
for the coordination game, stag hunt, and battle of sexes
(P\0.05 for each of the three games, Wilcoxon ranksum
test on average joint entropy of sixth to eighth time
point)—see Fig. 4a (upper panels). This suggests that the
ensemble of successful coordination trajectories has more
random variation. We also computed the mutual informa-
tion between the two players over the same normalized
Exp Brain Res (2011) 211:631–641 635
123time windows (Fig. 4b). At the beginning of the trial, the
mutual information was close to zero in all games and
increased only toward the end of the trial. However, in
coordinated trials the ﬁnal mutual information was elevated
compared to the ﬁnal mutual information in miscoordi-
nated trials (P\0.05 in each of the four games, Wilcoxon
ranksum test). This means that the ﬁnal positions in coor-
dinated trials tend to cluster together, whereas the ﬁnal
positions in miscoordinated trials are more scattered.
Accordingly, the two actors share more information at the
end of trials with successful coordination.
Since the pure Nash equilibria can be considered as
attractors in the payoff landscape, it is reasonable to expect
that the initial position has an inﬂuence on the probability
of reaching a particular Nash equilibrium, depending on
whether the initial point is in the basin of attraction or not.
We therefore examined the effect of the initial conﬁgura-
tion on the probability of coordination success at the end of
the movements. Figure 4c shows a histogram of the prob-
ability of successful coordination depending on the initial
positions of the players. In particular, it can be seen that
initial positions that are close to the pure Nash equilibria
lead to an increased probability of coordination success at
the end of the movements (Fig. 4d). Independent of the
starting position, coordination success at the end of the
movement is always greater than chance level. However,
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Fig. 3 a Endpoint distributions of the four different games for all
players. The x1-position corresponds to the ﬁnal position chosen by
Player 1 and the x2-position to the ﬁnal position of Player 2. The six
different colors correspond to the six different subject pairs. b The
distribution of the endpoints was binned into the four quadrants
corresponding to the two times two actions of the respective discrete
game. The quadrants in the coordination game correspond to the
actions left (L) and right (R). The quadrants in the stag hunt game
correspond to the actions stag (St) and hare (Ha). The quadrants in the
chicken game correspond to the actions swerve (Sw) and stay (St).
The quadrants in the battle of sexes game correspond to football (Fo)
and opera (Op). c Histogram over coordinated versus miscoordinated
solutions. In all games and conditions, there was a signiﬁcantly higher
frequency of the coordinated outcomes. The two stars indicate a
signiﬁcance level of P\0.01 in a Wilcoxon ranksum test over the six
different games. d Temporal evolution of coordination probability.
Trajectories were binned into 10 equidistant points. The coordination
probability is given by the fraction of trajectory points that lie in the
two quadrants corresponding to successful coordination. The error
bars are obtained by bootstrapping
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123successful coordination is more likely to occur when
players accidentally start out in favorable positions.
To further assess the effect of within-trial trajectory
variation on coordination success, we examined the timing
at which subjects’ trajectories showed little change from
the ﬁnal decision given by the endpoint when both players
crossed the target bar. Speciﬁcally, we determined the
earliest time at which each player’s trajectory stayed within
2 cm of their ﬁnal lateral endpoint. This allowed us to
assess whether players converged to their ﬁnal decision
early on (early convergence time) or whether the ﬁnal
position was chosen more abruptly (late convergence time).
The time difference in convergence between the two
players could then be determined as the absolute difference
between their convergence times. We found that in suc-
cessful coordination trials the convergence time difference
between players was signiﬁcantly elevated compared to
miscoordinated trials (P\0.02, Wilcoxon ranksum test for
equal medians of convergence time difference for all game
types). In particular, we found that this difference arises
from an early convergence of the ﬁrst player to the ﬁnal
solution (P\0.02, Wilcoxon ranksum test for equal
medians of early convergence time for all game types) and
is not due to a later convergence of the other player or an
increase in total trial time (Fig. 5). This suggests that
successful coordination is in general more likely to occur
when one of the players converges early to their position.
Finally, we devised a simple computational model to
investigate qualitatively a potential computational basis of
some of the features characteristic for within-trial coordi-
nation (see ‘‘Methods’’ for details). The computational
model can be thought of as a diffusion process through the
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Fig. 4 a, b Joint entropy and mutual information between the
distribution of positions of Player 1 and Player 2. All trajectories were
discretized into 10 equidistant points and the positions of these points
were categorized (see ‘‘Methods’’ for details). The average over
coordinated trajectories is shown in blue and the average over
miscoordinated trajectories is shown in green. During the movement,
the joint entropy is increased for coordinated solutions in the
coordination, stag hunt, and battle of sexes game. The mutual
information between the two players is always elevated at the end of
the movement for all games compared to miscoordinated trials. c,
d Dependence of coordination probability on initial positions of
Player 1 and Player 2. For initial positions close to the corners of the
workspace, the coordination probability at the end of the trial is
increased. The error bars in (d) are obtained through bootstrapping
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123payoff landscape and is a standard model in physics. In a
physical system, the payoff would correspond to an energy
surface and the players could be thought of as particles
moving stochastically in this energy landscape, trying to
move downhill (lower forces and hence higher payoff).
Diffusion models have also been previously applied to
understand coordination in iterative classic coordination
games (Crawford 1995). In our simulations, the initial
positions of the players were drawn from a distribution
similar to the initial distribution observed experimentally.
We then simulated diffusion in the payoff landscape,
assuming that each player estimates a noisy version of how
the spring stiffness varies with their lateral movement
(local payoff gradient) and tries to move downhill.
Importantly, there are no lateral forces in the experiment,
which means the modeled ‘‘downhill movement’’ does not
correspond to the robot forces that are pushing against the
subjects’ forward motion, but represent the subject’s vol-
untary choice following a noisy gradient in spring-constant
space (compare Fig. 2). This model allows us then to
determine the ﬁnal distribution of positions of each player
(Fig. 6, top row). The model captures the increased relative
occurrence of the Nash equilibria by showing that coordi-
nated solutions occur much more frequently than misco-
ordinated solutions (Fig. 6, second row). The model
accounts for the most frequent pattern of coordination in all
games, with the exception of the increased probability of
the experimentally observed [swerve, swerve] solution in
the chicken game. As observed in the experimental data,
the model also accounts for an increased joint entropy
during the movement between the positions of the players
in successful coordination trials as opposed to miscoordi-
nated trials (Fig. 6, third row). The model also captures that
the mutual information between the two players’ position
should be increased at the end of the trial in case of suc-
cessful coordination (Fig. 6, fourth row). Finally, the
model captures the increased difference in decision time in
successful coordination trials compared to miscoordinated
trials (Fig. 6, bottom row). However, there are also
important features that are not captured by the diffusion
model that are discussed below.
Discussion
In this study, we examined how coordination arises
between two coupled motor systems that interact in con-
tinuous single-trial games with multiple Nash equilibria.
Crucially, the presence of multiple equilibria creates the
problem of equilibrium selection where players have to
coordinate their actions in order to achieve low-cost out-
comes. In contrast to discrete, one-shot coordination
games, we found that subjects were able to coordinate
within individual trials in our motor games. As the payoff
matrix was permuted on each trial, ﬁnding a coordinated
solution is only possible through a continuous co-adapta-
tion process within a trial, in which the two players may
share information. Such continuous within-trial adaptation
processes are typical of motor interactions (Braun et al.
2009a). We tested subjects on four different coordination
games to ﬁnd common principles of successful coordina-
tion that govern all four different types of two-player motor
interactions. Our aim was to use these four different games
to conﬁrm the generality of our ﬁndings rather than to
investigate differences between the games. Successful
coordination trials were characterized by several features:
increased mutual information between the ﬁnal part of the
movements of the two players, an increase in joint entropy
during the movements, and an early convergence to the
ﬁnal position by one of the players. Moreover, we found
that the probability of coordination depended on the initial
position of the two players, in particular on their distance to
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Fig. 5 Difference in convergence times. We computed the time of
convergence to a particular choice as the time after which a player did
not leave a cone of 2 cm width. In coordinated trials (blue), the
difference of the convergence times between the two players was
always signiﬁcantly elevated compared to miscoordinated trials
(green), and the time the ﬁrst player converged to the ﬁnal solution
(Convergence Time-1) was signiﬁcantly lower compared to
miscoordinated trials. This was true for the coordination game (C),
the stag hunt (SH), the chicken game (CH), and the battle of sexes
game (BS). In contrast, the later convergence time and the total trial
time was not signiﬁcantly elevated (P[0.1, Wilcoxon ranksum test
for equal medians), except for the Battle of Sexes game. Yet, even in
the Battle of Sexes game, the effect of the early convergence time is
much stronger than the effect of the later convergence time
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123one of the pure Nash equilibria. Our results suggest that
coordination is achieved by a favorable starting position, a
stereotypical coordination pattern, and an early conver-
gence to a ﬁnal position by one of the players.
We used a model to explore whether features seen in our
results could arise from a simple diffusion model in which
each subject samples the noisy payoff gradient with respect
to their movement and tries to move downhill in the payoff
landscape thereby reducing effort. We show that the fea-
tures of joint entropy, mutual information, and conver-
gence time difference can be reproduced qualitatively by
this model. However, there were also important discrep-
ancies. First, the shape of the joint entropy functions does
not correspond to the experimentally observed inverse-U
shape for miscoordinated trials. Second, the mutual infor-
mation increases steadily over the course of the trial and
not abruptly at the end of the movement, as is observed
experimentally (compare Figs. 3 and 6). Third, the model
predicts that the probability of coordination decreases
monotonically with the initial distance from the Nash
equilibria (compare Supplementary Figure S5), whereas in
the experimental data, the probability increases again at the
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Fig. 6 Model simulations. (Row 1) Endpoint distribution of the
diffusion process for the different games after 50 time steps.
Thousand eight hundred draws are shown. (Row 2) Histogram over
simulated endpoints. The histograms are similar to the experimental
ones—compare Fig. 3. Analogous to the experimental data, endpoints
can be classiﬁed as coordinated and miscoordinated. (Row 3) Joint
entropy of the position distributions of player 1 and player 2. During
the movement, the joint entropy is elevated in successful coordination
trials (blue) compared to miscoordinated trials (green). This is a
similar pattern observed in the experimental data—compare Fig. 4.
(Row 4) Mutual information between the position distributions of
player 1 and player 2. At the end of the movement, the mutual
information is elevated in successful coordination trials (blue)
compared to miscoordinated trials (green). The same pattern is
observed in the experimental data—compare Fig. 4.( Row 5) Tem-
poral difference in convergence time. In coordinated trials, the
difference in time when the players converge to their ﬁnal position is
increased compared to miscoordinated trials. The same pattern is
observed in the experimental data—compare Fig. 5
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123border of maximum distance (compare Fig. 4). First, it
needs to be noted that the model completely ignores any
movement dynamics and is only concerned with the
abstract process of within-trial co-adaptation. Furthermore,
in the experiment subjects have to sample the force land-
scape and do not know the inﬁnitesimal gradient. Despite
these shortcomings this simple model shows that coordi-
nation can in principle arise through gradient-descent-like
co-adaptation and it reproduces a number of characteristic
properties of two-player coordination. In the future, more
complex models that take subjects’ movement properties
into account have to be developed to better understand the
co-adaptation processes during two-player motor
interactions.
In a previous study (Braun et al. 2009b), we have shown
that two-player interactions in a continuous motor game
version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma can be understood by
the normative concept of Nash equilibria. However, in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma the Nash solution is unique and cor-
responds to a minimax-solution, which means that each
player could select the Nash solution independently and
thus minimize the maximum effort. In the current study,
each game had several equilibria giving rise to the novel
problem of equilibrium selection. In these coordination
games, it is no longer possible for each player to select
their optimal strategy independently. Instead, players have
to coordinate their actions in order to achieve optimal Nash
solutions. They have to explore actively the payoff land-
scape in order to converge jointly to a coordinated solution.
Our results suggest that this coordination arises naturally as
the behavior of the actors gets increasingly correlated
through a process of co-adaptation.
In the game-theoretic literature, diffusion processes
have been suggested previously to model learning and co-
adaptation in games (Foster and Young 1990; Fudenberg
and Harris 1992; Kandori et al. 1993; Binmore et al. 1995;
Binmore and Samuelson 1999), including the special case
of coordination games (Crawford 1995). In particular, in
evolutionary game theory, adaptation processes are often
modeled as diffusion-like processes based on so-called
replicator equations (Weibull 1995; Ruijgrok and Ruijgrok
2005; Chalub and Souza 2009). These replicator equations
can be thought of as population equations that facilitate
’’survival’’ of useful strategies and leave unsuccessful
strategies to perish. Solutions of the replicator equations
correspond to Nash solutions that are stable to perturba-
tions, that is, they are evolutionarily stable strategies
(Smith 1982). In three of our motor game experiments the
predicted pure Nash solutions corresponded to evolution-
arily stable strategies. However, in the chicken game, this
was not the case, and the evolutionarily stable strategy is a
mixed Nash equilibrium. Interestingly, this is also the game
where our model predictions were the poorest. In the
future, it might therefore be interesting to investigate
whether the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies
might be even more relevant to understand multi-player
motor interactions than the concept of Nash equilibria.
Diffusion processes have also been used extensively to
model decision-making in psychology and neurobiology
(Busemeyer and Townsend 1993; Busemeyer and Diedrich
2002; Smith and Ratcliff 2004; Gold and Shadlen 2007). In
such models, evidence is accumulated before a decision
boundary is reached and the appropriate action executed. In
our study, the evidence accumulation process happens
during the movement in a continuous fashion before the
ﬁnal decision at the target bar is taken. Therefore, the co-
adaptation process for coordination might also be con-
ceived as a continuous decision-making process linking the
neurobiology of decision-making to the neurobiology of
social interactions. Previous studies on the neuroscience of
social interactions have suggested common principles for
motor control and social interactions, in particular the
usage of forward internal models for predictive control and
action understanding (Wolpert et al. 2003). In our task, we
have not found evidence for model-based predictive con-
trol, and our model simulations show that single-trial
coordination can be achieved by co-adaptive processes
performing essentially gradient descent on a force land-
scape. This might be a consequence of our task design, as
the force landscape changed every trial such that subjects
could not predict the payoffs. In this task, participants were
also not aware of the consequence of there actions on the
other player, since each player could not feel the force
feedback given to the other player. However, when we
conducted the same experiment and gave visual feedback
of the forces experienced by the other player, the results
remained essentially unchanged (see Supplementary Figure
S6). It could be the case, however, that subjects simply
ignored this feedback signal, even though it was explained
to them before the start of the experiments. Our results
suggest therefore that single-trial coordination in continu-
ous motor tasks can be achieved in the absence of pre-
dictive control. However, tasks in which the payoff
landscape is constant over trials, and therefore learnable,
might facilitate the formation of predictive internal models
for two-person motor interactions.
In previous studies, it has been shown that natural pat-
tern of coordination can arise between participants when
provided with feedback of the other participant, such as the
synchronization of gait patterns—for a review see (Kelso
1995). This coordination is typically explained as the
consequence of stable conﬁgurations of nonlinearly inter-
acting components (Haken et al. 1985). Game-theoretic
models of adaptation are very similar to these dynamical
systems models in the sense that they also converge to
stable solutions given by ﬁx points or other attractors. The
640 Exp Brain Res (2011) 211:631–641
123force landscape of our coordination landscape can be
conceived as an attractor landscape where the pure Nash
equilibria correspond to point attractors. Consequently, the
convergence to a particular equilibrium depends on the
initial position starting out in a particular basin of attraction
of one of the equilibria. The interesting difference to purely
dynamical systems models is that game-theoretic models
allow making a connection to normative optimality models
of acting. In our case, that means that the Nash equilibria
are not only attractors in a dynamical system, but they also
represent optimal solutions to a game-theoretic optimiza-
tion problem. Consequently, movements are not only
interpretable in terms of an abstract attractor landscape but
also in terms of behaviorally relevant cost parameters such
as movement accuracy or energy consumption. Thus, the
two perspectives of dynamical systems and optimality
models of acting are not only compatible but also com-
plement each other (Schaal et al. 2007). In summary, our
study has three main novel ﬁndings. First, successful
coordination is facilitated by a favorable starting state of
both players. Second, coordination reﬂects a more stereo-
typical coordination pattern between players when com-
pared to miscoordinated trials. Finally, when one player
reaches an early convergence time relative to the other
player, this increases the chance of successful coordination.
We also show that these features can be qualitatively ﬁt by
a simple diffusion model of coordination.
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